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Critical Legal Studies: An Afterword
John Henry Schlegel
. . . where ignorant armies clash by night.*
The patient reader who has struggled through this symposium
may feel lots of things-weariness verging on boredom perhaps, in-
terest maybe, delight hopefully. Some, however, will have a linger-
ing feeling much like Arnold on that beach-a sense of things going
on, of disputes obscure to outsiders, somehow hidden from view by
darkness or fog or smoke. That feeling is, I suggest, not necessarily
the after-image of a bedazzled brain. It is real because something is
going on in each piece that is hidden from view and that ought to be
brought to light, to be made the subject of critical thought.
For a historian of American Legal Realism, the necessary analogy
is to is the Great Realist Debate. As the story is usually told, one day
Roscoe Pound decided that he had to speak out about some disquiet-
ing tendencies in the scholarship and thought of "some of our
younger teachers of law," which provoked Llewellyn to reply deny-
ing Pound's charges. While the event was more complicated than
that, the aftermath of the event is clear. A new cottage industry was
born: the making of handcrafted definitions of what Realism really
was. Were one to carefully review the product of this industry, one
would be struck with a deep sense of wonder about what was at stake
in the underlying dispute. What turf-intellectual, political, moral,
or even personal (in terms of control of an intellectual movement)-
was implicated by the answer given to the question "What was Real-
ism?" so that anyone would fight about it?
How one answers that question about Realism is of little impor-
tance to the issues raised by this Symposium. What is important is to
recognize that, as was the case with Realism's cottage industry, in
each of these pieces there is an implicit or explicit definition of Criti-
cal Legal Studies. Both adherents to and critics of OLS offer these
definitions which are by no means all the same. Mine' is not
* M. ARNOLD, DOVER BEACH (London 1867).
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Gordon's, 2 and his is not Trubek's,3 for example. Each definition has
the necessary property of including some things and excluding
others. Each definer thus exercises a choice about what to include
and what to exclude. That is the burden of one strand of Critical
thought. There are no socially necessary categories; choice must al-
ways be exercised when ordering the world. Thus one may say that
this entire batch of scholarship is at bottom a fight about a defini-
tion, about what Critical Legal Studies is. When one sees such a
fight, one ought to wonder what is at stake in it. It cannot be truth,
for there is no choice to truth. What, then, is at issue that would
make me define Critical Legal Studies socially and Gordon define it
intellectually? That would cause Trubek to give a different intellec-
tual definition than both Gordon's and Ted White's?4
I do not think it profitable for me to answer this question. My
answer would only begin an infinite regress. But by the same token, I
think it is important to recognize that it is these battles over defini-
tion with their entrances, exits, alarms, and fires that one perceives
but dimly through the darkness or fog or smoke. Perhaps those who
are persuaded that CLS has something to offer to legal thought will
find it appropriate to turn their new method to the question of what
this occluded battle is about.
2. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984).
3. Trubek, Where the Action is." Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REV. 575
(1984).
4. White, The Inevitability of Critical Legal Studies, '.6 STAN. L. REV. 649 (1984).
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